I'm not surprised by the data recovery company story, it feels like I only hear bad things about that industry. I remember something similar happened with LinusTechTips.
Absolutely heroic effort. And that data recovery company should go out of business.
chii 3 hours ago [-]
It is named and shamed in the comments of that video somewhere.
Data recovery companies ought to have the integrity to just say no to a job, if they cannot do it risk free. Trying and failing with the risk of damaging the original data could be very costly to the customer, even if they don't charge money - the customer's lost data could be priceless.
sllabres 3 hours ago [-]
A lot of work, but with success as reward!
Makes you wonder how easy or difficult it will be in 30 years to 'recover' data from today.
dehrmann 3 hours ago [-]
> Makes you wonder how easy or difficult it will be in 30 years to 'recover' data from today.
The challenges will be different. Flash loses its charge in 30 years, most disks are encrypted, and on-site physical backups are mostly a thing of the past. The source might survive in a cloud repo, but it'll either be tied up for legal reasons or deleted when the customer stops paying the bill. But storage is cheap and getting cheaper!
ljlolel 3 hours ago [-]
Easy. The “deleted” even overwritten data can leave ghosts even multiple layers deep (think of a clay tablet or painting with multiple inscriptions)
Encryption for 30 years ago? Trivially breakable with quantum
mjg59 2 minutes ago [-]
Shor's algorithm is primarily relevant to asymmetric cryptography, and disk encryption is pretty much universally symmetric. Quantum computers do nothing to break modern disk encryption.
jetbalsa 32 minutes ago [-]
Has this been proven for flash storage? Once a flash charge is depleted its gone forever, its not like magnetic storage of old.
rjst01 2 hours ago [-]
> Encryption for 30 years ago? Trivially breakable with quantum
I wouldn't be so sure - quantum computers aren't nearly as effective for symmetric algorithms as they are for pre-quantum asymmetric algorithms.
bbarnett 1 hours ago [-]
Regardless of the parent's statement, just normal compute in 30 years, plus general vulnerabilities and weaknesses discovered, will ensure that anything encrypted today is easily readable in the future.
I can't think of anything from 30 years ago that isn't just a joke today. The same will likely be true by 2050, quantum computing or not. I wonder how many people realise this?
Even if one disagrees with my certainty, I think people should still plan for the concept that there's a strong probability it will be so. Encryption is really not about preventing data exposure, but about delaying it.
Any other view regarding encryption means disappointment.
Dylan16807 43 minutes ago [-]
> I can't think of anything from 30 years ago that isn't just a joke today.
AES is only 3 years shy of 30.
If you used MD5 as a keystream generator I believe that would still be secure and that's 33 years old.
3DES is still pretty secure, isn't it? That's 44 years old.
As for today's data, there's always risk into the future but we've gotten better as making secure algorithms over time and avoiding quantum attacks seems to mostly be a matter of doubling key length. I'd worry more about plain old leaks.
charcircuit 1 hours ago [-]
>normal compute
You are underestimating the exponential possibilities of keys.
>plus general vulnerabilities and weaknesses discovered, will ensure that anything encrypted today is easily readable in the future.
You can't just assume that there is always going to be new vulnerabilities that cause it to be broken. It ignores that people have improved at designing secure cryptography over time.
Cthulhu_ 1 hours ago [-]
Hard, but it depends on backup / duplication strategies; this is why e.g. the internet archive is so important, and I hope there are multiple parties doing the same thing for redundancy.
I enjoyed skimming through this: https://github.com/HighwayFrogs/frogger2-vss/blob/main/teamS...
The long road to recover Frogger 2 source from tape drives - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36061574 - May 2023 (213 comments)
Data recovery companies ought to have the integrity to just say no to a job, if they cannot do it risk free. Trying and failing with the risk of damaging the original data could be very costly to the customer, even if they don't charge money - the customer's lost data could be priceless.
The challenges will be different. Flash loses its charge in 30 years, most disks are encrypted, and on-site physical backups are mostly a thing of the past. The source might survive in a cloud repo, but it'll either be tied up for legal reasons or deleted when the customer stops paying the bill. But storage is cheap and getting cheaper!
Encryption for 30 years ago? Trivially breakable with quantum
I wouldn't be so sure - quantum computers aren't nearly as effective for symmetric algorithms as they are for pre-quantum asymmetric algorithms.
I can't think of anything from 30 years ago that isn't just a joke today. The same will likely be true by 2050, quantum computing or not. I wonder how many people realise this?
Even if one disagrees with my certainty, I think people should still plan for the concept that there's a strong probability it will be so. Encryption is really not about preventing data exposure, but about delaying it.
Any other view regarding encryption means disappointment.
AES is only 3 years shy of 30.
If you used MD5 as a keystream generator I believe that would still be secure and that's 33 years old.
3DES is still pretty secure, isn't it? That's 44 years old.
As for today's data, there's always risk into the future but we've gotten better as making secure algorithms over time and avoiding quantum attacks seems to mostly be a matter of doubling key length. I'd worry more about plain old leaks.
You are underestimating the exponential possibilities of keys.
>plus general vulnerabilities and weaknesses discovered, will ensure that anything encrypted today is easily readable in the future.
You can't just assume that there is always going to be new vulnerabilities that cause it to be broken. It ignores that people have improved at designing secure cryptography over time.